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Microfinancing in Developing Countries: An Assessment Taking Particular Account of 
the Views of Becker and Posner 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the views expressed by Gary Becker and Richard Posner about the 
economic value of relying on microfinancing for economic development as well as their 
opinions about its desirability as a means of alleviating poverty. It also raises some issues 
overlooked by Becker and Posner. Where relevant, the discussion is related to results obtained 
from a case study of microfinancing in the Sindh District of Pakistan. Subjects covered include 
the economic efficiency of the supply of microfinance, the optimality of microfinancing versus 
philanthropy, whether high interest rates and short-term loans for microfinance are justified, 
preference for females rather than males in microfinancing, social networking and the efficient 
provision and allocation of microfinance, and the prospects for escaping from poverty as a 
result of microfinancing. 
Keywords: economic development, institutional financing, microfinance, Pakistan, poverty, 
social networks 
JEL codes: G10, O11, O16 
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Microfinancing in Developing Countries: An Assessment Taking Particular Account of 
the Views of Becker and Posner 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 47 (pp. 347-352) of their book, Uncommon Sense: Economic Insights from 
Marriage to Terrorism, Becker and Posner (2009) provide a stimulating analysis of the socio-
economic consequences of microfinance. Their book consists of a reproduction of a collection 
of their blogs which address topical issues in social economics. Several of their points about 
microfinance challenge common views. They believe that the ability of microfinancing to 
promote economic development has been overrated. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
their evaluation of microfinancing and raise some points which they do not mention.  
Topics considered in turn are economic efficiency aspects of microfinancing, the 
empowerment of women in the family as a result of their receipt of microfinance, the optimality 
of microfinancing versus the provision of philanthropy, alternative forms of finance to 
microfinance, and preference for providing micro-loans to females rather than males. Several 
other relevant issues not mentioned by Becker and Posner are also raised. The discussion is 
related to the results obtained from focal group discussions with women from four rural villages 
in the Sindh District of Pakistan (Tisdell et al., 2017). These women all worked in agriculture 
and their households owned little or no land. All were poor. 
2. The Economic Efficiency of Microfinancing 
Becker argues that microfinancing is a relatively efficient means for assisting the poor. Both 
he and Posner point out that interest rates on micro-loans are high, even though they are not as 
high as those charged by commercial lenders. The high interest rates charged for microfinance 
are seen by Becker and Posner as a mechanism for rationing the limited amount of aggregate 
microfinance available to borrowers. They argue only those borrowers who feel confident that 
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they are likely to obtain a sufficient return to cover the interest plus the repayment of principal 
are likely to want to borrow.  
Becker (Becker and Posner, 2009, pp. 348-349) states: “If private groups want to make gifts to 
rural women in poor countries, making them through micro-loans is a much better way than 
many alternatives. Loans at considerable interest rates help donors select from a large number 
of persons who believe they deserve help. By requiring recipients to engage in productive 
activities that yield enough returns to pay interest and repay principal, micro-loans in effect 
help those with ideas and willingness to work hard. What better way to choose among too many 
people who are really poor?” 
He points out that he believes it always to be best to reward people who are willing to help 
themselves. However, this overlooks the fact that those who are the poorest often lack the 
means to help themselves and to engage in entrepreneurship, and cannot afford to assume the 
risks associated with economic entrepreneurship (see Tisdell et al., 2017). Furthermore, they 
often spend so much time in ensuring their survival that they have little or no time for other 
forms of entrepreneurship, such as establishing social networks that may bring them economic 
advantage (Tisdell et al., 2017). The scope for social entrepreneurship is restricted by their 
economic poverty.   
The question also arises of the extent to which economic efficiencies should be tempered by 
the needs of the very poorest households. For example, should some of the extremely poor who 
possess very few resources be given loans at a more favorable interest rate than the less poor, 
or even gifts? This will be discussed in a section about philanthropy versus microfinancing. 
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3. The Empowerment of Women Within the Family as a Result of their Access to 
Microfinance 
Becker (Becker and Posner, 2009, p.348) states that the available evidence indicates that 
women who obtain microfinancing improve their status in the family and increase their 
bargaining power. He asserts “this shows up as an increase in the education of daughters and 
also sons, greater spending on medications, and on women’s assets, like gold, in families who 
have women who borrow under… [microfinancing] programs.” This may be so, but it is 
unlikely to be the case when women take loans as fronts for husbands and other male relatives 
of their family, as did women from Sanwala Khan Jamali village in Pakistan, as reported in 
Tisdell et al. (2017). On the other hand, as reported by Tisdell et al. (2017) the women from 
Gagri village in Pakistan took loans which they themselves used for productive agricultural 
purposes. In all probability, this raised their status within their families. Nevertheless, the 
possibility should not be dismissed that some males in the household of women who are able 
to improve their economic situation may resent the growing empowerment of these women and 
react negatively to it. 
In fact, in strongly patriarchal societies, such as that of Pakistan, it has been argued that the 
availability of microfinance tends to disempower women (Zulfiqar, 2017, p. 167). Banerjee et 
al. (2015) concluded from an empirical study in India that increased access to microfinance did 
not improve the health and educational status of women, nor increase their availability of 
consumption goods, and failed to enhance their role in decision-making within the household. 
Possibly, however, one should not generalize from this result. The relationships involved may 
be situational. They are likely to depend on the nature of the patriarchy in the society concerned. 
If men have strong control over all the finances in the household (including loans to its female 
members and income earned as a result), then micro-loans are likely to do little to empower 
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women. Nevertheless, in some cases, they do increase their self-esteem and confidence. The 
situation needs closer examination at the grassroots level.  
4. The Optimality of Microfinancing versus the Provision of Philanthropy 
Like Becker, Posner (Becker and Posner, 2009, p. 350) believes that microfinancing is 
preferable to philanthropy, that is, the provision of gifts and grants to assist the poor. He adopts 
the same type of selective efficiency argument as Becker, namely only those with sufficient 
economic prospects will seek microfinance.  There is evidence from a survey of rural women 
in Pakistan (Tisdell et al., 2017) that self-selection by borrowers does occur. Nevertheless, it is 
not a perfect process. Some who may benefit from such loans may fail, for example, to apply 
for them because of their lack of knowledge of the profitability of opportunities available to 
them.  
We should also distinguish between two types of economic efficiency, namely the efficiency 
in the sorting process for those demanding loans (transaction costs), and the economic 
efficiency in the allocation (distribution) of the limited amount of available funds. The main 
focus of Becker and Posner is on the efficiency of the allocation process. From a resource 
allocation point of view, in a perfect market for microfinance (according to neoclassical 
economic theory), the rate of interest on micro-loans ought to be the same for all such loans 
involving the same degree of risk. At least, this is so if the Kaldor-Hicks (potential Paretian 
improvement) criterion is adopted. The first type of problem is one involving transaction costs 
whereas the second involves the objective of obtaining the highest return on the aggregate 
amount of microfinance distributed.  
In practice, microfinance markets are far from perfect. It is, therefore, unlikely that funds will 
be distributed so as to maximize the return on their aggregate amount. Moreover, the rate of 
interest on micro-loans may not be ideally adjusted to allow for variations in the risk of such 
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loans. Ignorance about the real risk and social prejudice may influence the disbursement of 
such loans. 
The Kaldor-Hicks concept of economic efficiency does not take into account the desirability 
or otherwise of income distribution effects associated with its attainment. When this factor is 
taken into account, there may be a case for providing micro-loans to the poorest members of a 
community on more favorable terms to those who are less poor, but still poor. 
In any case, most NGOs providing micro-loans seem to adopt a mixed approach: some of their 
loans are virtually on commercial terms, some are at reduced rates of interest and some of their 
support is purely charitable or philanthropic. For example, this is so in the case of the Sindh 
Rural Support Organisation. Posner suggests that a mixed strategy of this type is adopted by 
the Grameen Bank. The possible reasons for this mixed strategy will be discussed in the next 
section. 
The main message of Becker and Posner is that providing charity to the poor is likely to be at 
the expense of economic efficiency, in the two senses stated above. Their position is not 
surprising. Posner, for example, has strongly advocated the application of the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion as a desirable (just) approach to economic policy (Posner, 1981, Posner, 1985). The 
main reason why he favors it is his belief that its application will result in maximum economic 
growth and eventually will provide an economic benefit to all. In effect, he supports the 
"trickle-down" thesis, that is, that the poor will eventually be lifted out of poverty by 
macroeconomic growth. However, this view is deceptive because there is no guarantee that 
losers from such an approach will be eventually compensated as a result of the stimulation of 
economic growth, and many of those affected may be dead before the trickle down occurs. 
While Becker’s view that preference should be given to the poor who are prepared to help 
themselves, this disregards the fact that most of those in severe poverty are unable to help 
7 
 
themselves because of their lack of resource endowments. They are so strongly trapped in 
poverty, it is almost impossible for them to escape because of their economic circumstances. 
In general, they have a lack of resources endowments and entitlements as has been pointed out 
by (Sen, 1992), and this constricts their economic capabilities. 
Some individuals may be poor due to circumstances beyond their control, but others may be 
poor because of their decision-making. Sometimes, the former are regarded as the “deserving 
poor”, and the latter not so. Rawls’ principle of justice (Rawls, 1971) suggests that extending 
assistance to the former group, for example, the handicapped, would be justified since being in 
their poor situation is a chance event. Similarly, it can be argued that doing likewise for those 
who owe their poverty to social constraints is justified. Thus, one would expect both Rawls and 
Sen to reject the ethical approach to economic policy adopted by Becker and Posner.  
Considering the opposing views, an intermediate position is probably the most tenable. 
Compensating the poor entirely for their disadvantage by gift-giving may severely restrict the 
prospects for economic growth, but some compensation seems justified on ethical grounds. If, 
as a result of this compensation, the poor are able to significantly increase their productivity 
and their incomes, then the case for assisting them by means of some charity is strengthened. 
5. To What Extent are High Interest Rates and Short-Term Loans for Microfinance 
Justified and Why do They Occur? 
Most NGOs providing micro-loans seem to charge high interest rates on most of their loans 
and these loans are usually for short periods of time. This may partly reflect the risk of default 
of repayment and the transaction costs involved in making and managing such loans. In 
addition, this may be done, as was discussed above, because of the type of allocation (rationing) 
and sorting role played by interest rates in selecting borrowers. 
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It should, however, be noted that NGOs which provide development assistance engage in a 
broad range of policies to deliver that assistance. On one end of the spectrum are those that are 
purely philanthropic, and at the other end of the spectrum are those that expect to receive a 
positive economic return on their assistance. Many NGOs providing micro-loans have a mixed 
portfolio of assistance. For example, some loans are made at commercial and near-commercial 
interest rates, others at concessional rates, and a portion of their portfolio may also consist of 
gifts or donations to the needy. This seems to be so of the Sindh Rural Support Organisation. 
The proportion of high-interest loans in the portfolio of such bodies varies. Posner (Becker and 
Posner, 2009) suggests that in the case of the Grameen Bank, it could be quite high. 
What factors (other than those mentioned above) might motivate microfinancing NGOs to 
charge high interest rates on their loans? Their prime aim might be to survive as an organization 
(remain solvent) and in many cases, to grow in size. Provided the rate of default on high interest 
loans is not too high, charging high interest rates would help them to achieve these objectives.  
This strategy would also help them to sustain or increase the size of their pool of funds for 
lending to the poor. Thus, over time, this policy would contribute to sustaining or increasing 
their level of financial support to the poor; even though the poorest families are likely to miss 
out on funding because they are unable to service loans, as a result of their inability to pay high 
rates of interest. Nevertheless, most microfinancing NGOs are not completely self-funded – 
they rely for varying portions of their funds on donations and sometimes government transfers. 
One would expect this to be taken into account in their strategies for assisting the poor.  
While some of those donors to microfinancing NGOs may feel that the ethical views expressed 
by Becker and Posner are desirable, others may subscribe to a more philanthropic or charitable 
ethics. In order to increase the likely level of their receipt of donations, some microfinancing 
NGOs include philanthropic assistance in their portfolios. In certain cases, this portion of their 
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portfolio may be given priority in advertising in order to attract donations from philanthropic 
donors. In practice, the financing and the financial strategies of NGOs providing development 
assistance cover a wide spectrum.  
Two other aspects of micro-loans are worth considering. These are the length of time for which 
they are given and the schedule of repayments. Many such loans seem to be for a period of one 
or two years, and repayments are often required very soon after the loan is given (Tisdell et al., 
2017). The latter can cause cash flow problems for loan recipients because many investments 
take some time before they yield a significant return. Consequently, investments which yield a 
quick return tend to be favored and/or loans to borrowers who are able to cover initial cash 
flow shortages by drawing on other sources, for example, by selling some other assets. The 
repayment conditions for many micro-loans can be expected to deter individuals from the 
poorest households from seeking such loans. 
6. Alternative Forms of Financing to Institutional Microfinancing 
Posner (Becker and Posner, 2009) briefly considers alternative sources of financing to 
microfinancing as means for poverty alleviation. He discusses: 
 Commercial lending 
 Family or clan loans, and 
 Equity financing. 
He points out that the ability of and the willingness of commercial institutions, such as 
commercial banks, to engage in microfinancing, is very limited – virtually non-existent. This 
is because of the high transaction costs involved in the making of such loans. These costs arise 
partly from the formality of their procedures. Prudential requirements and obligations to their 
shareholders also limit the willingness of these institutions to provide micro-loans. Thus, they 
do not service the same “markets” as microfinancing NGOs.  
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The second possible source of micro-loans for the poor mentioned by Posner (Becker and 
Posner, 2009)are family or clan loans. These involve little transaction costs. The extent to 
which such loans are likely to be substitutes for microfinancing by NGOs is probably quite 
limited because many poor families and clans have no surplus funds. Nevertheless, they can be 
important in some societies. Furthermore, in some societies, family or clan loans are unlikely 
to be available to women because of local social customs. These types of loans are unable to 
fill the “market” niche filled by the microfinancing of NGOs. 
Posner expresses a preference for equity financing or joint venture financing but considers that 
this is likely to be uneconomic for micro-loans intended to assist the poor. This is so because 
the transaction costs experienced by the provider are likely to be high. Also, the client may 
have an incentive to “hide” the real return on the investment from the financier. However, some 
microfinancing NGOs may include some equity financing in their assistance portfolios.  
While Posner’s classification of possible sources for microfinancing is a useful introduction to 
the subject, it does not provide in-depth analysis. For example, only limited attention is given 
to the evolution of hybrid microfinancing institutions. In Pakistan, for example, some 
microfinancing NGOs have spun-off microfinance banks (such as Tameer Bank) as separate 
entities (Zulfiqar, 2017). These banks specialize in small loans, attach conditions to loans 
which reduce the bank’s risk of loss if there is default, and these banks are, in general, profit-
oriented. Posner might no doubt welcome such a development on economic efficiency grounds. 
Whether or not this development reduces the amount of micro-funds available to women is 
unclear. While Zulfiqar (2017) argues that it does, it may make a net addition to the total funds 
available for micro-loans to women on non-commercial terms. The extent to which a 
substitution effect occurs, or does not do so, needs investigation. 
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The general picture emerges that loans made by microfinancing NGOs provide a supply of 
funding to the poor which otherwise would be missing due to market and social failures. This 
extra supply is economically beneficial. 
7. Preference for Female rather than Male Borrowers in Microfinancing 
Posner states that the majority of micro-loans are made to women rather than men. Reasons for 
this could include the following: 
 Females are more disadvantaged in obtaining loans than males. 
 They are able to implement projects which will give a higher return than those of males, 
as claimed by Naudé (2011). 
 They are likely to be more diligent in their repayments than are males, according to 
Becker and Posner (2009). 
 The “bias” in favor of females may be appealing to some of those donating to 
microfinancing NGOs. 
Overall, in the absence of NGO microfinancing, the lack of availability of funds for female-
initiated projects is likely greater than males. In other words, “market” failure is more 
prominent in relation to the demand of women for finance compared to that of men. 
Nevertheless, some poverty-stricken males may experience similar problems to females in 
obtaining finance. Posner (Becker and Posner, 2009) suggest that the financial needs of 
impoverished males should be given greater consideration in microfinancing. 
In Pakistan, while females account for the largest proportion of borrowers from NGO micro-
financiers, males predominate in the case of loans from microfinance banks (Zulfiqar, 2017). 
Zulfiqar is concerned that the development of microfinancing banks in Pakistan might reduce 
the availability of micro-loans to women because microfinancing banks primarily have 
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commercial goals. This substitution does not appear to have happened yet, and may not occur. 
However, micro-loan banks will be more focused on profits in making micro-loans than NGOs 
and therefore less likely to take into account the impact of such loans on reducing poverty, and 
are likely to have a higher proportion of the non-poor among their customers than NGO micro-
financiers. While the development of micro-financing banks seems to favour males, they 
possibly do little to supply finance to the poorest males. 
8. To What Extent can Social Networking Contribute to the Efficient Provision and 
Allocation of Microfinance?  
Tisdell et al. (2017) have observed that a group of poor rural women in Pakistan who have been 
engaged in a significant amount of social networking (and were politically active) secured more 
micro-loans and also other means of support for agricultural development than groups of 
women who were uninvolved or relatively inactive in this regard. It could be said that this 
poorer group amassed more social capital than the rest. That raises the question of whether it 
is economically desirable for other female groups which engage in little or no accumulation of 
this type of social capital to do so.  
Apart from the fact that many of those who fail to engage in social networking in order to 
obtain development assistance do so because this is uneconomic for them (Tisdell et al., 2017), 
the larger the number engaged in social networking for the purpose of obtaining limited 
available microfinance, the higher will be the economic transaction costs incurred by potential 
borrowers. This is because establishing and maintaining social networks incurs a cost, for 
example, the opportunity cost of time expended on this activity. If the pool of funds available 
for micro-loans is limited, increased network competition can add to the overall costs 
experienced by potential borrowers in trying to obtain loans.  
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However, it might be argued that this increased networking would provide extra information 
to financiers, would reduce their transaction costs, and consequently improve their allocation 
of micro-loans. This may nevertheless, not happen. Those demanding micro-loans are likely to 
vary in the persuasiveness and therefore lenders would still have to sort out demands. 
Furthermore, the social connections of potential borrowers may bias the allocation of loans.  
In assessing the value of social networks, it is necessary to keep in mind the fallacy of 
composition. Just because it is found in a sample that superior social networking has enabled 
some groups to obtain more microfinancing and economic development benefits than others, 
it does not follow that increased social networking by all will enable all to obtain an increased 
amount of microfinance or greater economic support for development. This appears to be 
frequently overlooked in studies of the value of social networking. 
9. What are the Prospects of Poor Agricultural Families Escaping from Poverty as a 
Result of Microfinancing? 
The capacity of microfinancing to relieve poverty needs to be assessed in an economy-wide 
context. Although it can provide some relief from poverty, it is probably not a long-term 
solution to poverty reduction in situations where households own small amounts of land. Given 
the existence of positive economies of scale as a function of farm size in modern agriculture, 
those owning small amounts of land cannot take advantage of these economies. If they depend 
mainly on market sales to earn their income, they may find that in the long-term, their market 
supplies become increasingly uncompetitive with supplies from larger farms, thereby reducing 
their levels of income. In such circumstances, they can be expected to seek alternative 
employment, most likely off-farm. However, in developing countries, such as Pakistan, the 
opportunities for this are liable to very limited, unless the whole economy exhibits significant 
economic growth, as has happened in China. How the poor will cope with this situation is 
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unclear. They may, for instance, revert to greater reliance on subsistence (non-market) 
strategies to survive.  
It is observed in some countries, for example, Pakistan, that land inheritance procedures are 
leading to increasing subdivision of land owned by families. This is happening at the same as 
the number of larger-sized farms are increasing due to commercial considerations, land 
speculation, and the fact that owning large amounts of agricultural land creates social prestige.  
10. Concluding Remarks 
The availability of microfinance enables some of the “deserving” poor to alleviate their poverty 
but it seems to do little to reduce the poverty of the very poorest agriculturalists because of 
their lack of assets, such as having very little land to complement their investment, and because 
of their inability to service such loans and/or to bear the high degree of risk they experience by 
taking such loans (see, for example, Tisdell et al., 2017). In the absence of the greater 
availability of economy-wide employment opportunities, this group can probably only be 
helped by charity.  
Even though existing systems of microfinancing are not perfect from some economic and social 
points of view, microfinancing does help to fill gaps in the financial system which otherwise 
would be vacant. Overall it, therefore, confers a net economic benefit by reducing the presence 
of missing financial "markets". 
Despite the inability of microfinancing to provide a long-term solution to reducing poverty 
among poor agriculturalists in developing countries, it is able to assist some, and for those, it 
may buy time until the economy grows and creates new opportunities for their employment. 
This is not to say that all countries will be able to achieve sufficient economic growth to 
alleviate the existence of poverty. Some, for example, are being held back in this regard by a 
lack of law and order, as well as the presence of terrorism and their social customs. Becker and 
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Posner (2009) are correct in arguing that the ability of microfinancing to stimulate economic 
growth is quite limited. Furthermore, its scope for reducing poverty is restricted. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that it is not beneficial nor that it cannot make a modest contribution to 
economic growth.  
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